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Abstract—We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric
information where each player observes privately a noisy version
of a (hidden) state of the world V , resulting in dependent private
observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria
that use private beliefs in their strategies as sufficient statistics
for summarizing their observation history. The main difficulty
in finding the appropriate sufficient statistic (state) for the
structured strategies arises from the fact that players need to
construct (private) beliefs on other players’ private beliefs on V ,
which in turn would imply that an infinite hierarchy of beliefs on
beliefs needs to be constructed, rendering the problem unsolvable.
We show that this is not the case: each player’s belief on other
players’ beliefs on V can be characterized by her own belief on V
and some appropriately defined public belief. We then specialize
this setting to the case of a Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG)
non-zero-sum game and we characterize linear structured PBE
that can be found through a backward/forward algorithm akin to
dynamic programming for the standard LQG control problem.
Unlike the standard LQG problem, however, some of the required
quantities for the Kalman filter are observation-dependent and
thus cannot be evaluated off-line through a forward recursion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic games with asymmetric information play an im-
portant role in decision and control problems, yet there is no
general framework to study such games in a tractable manner.
The appropriate solution concept for these games is some no-
tion of equilibrium such as Bayesian Nash equilibrium, perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium, etc. [2]–
[4]. Due to the dynamic nature of such games, the players’
histories expand with time and therefore the corresponding
strategies have an expanding domain. To mitigate this problem,
researchers have introduced equilibrium concepts that summa-
rize the time expanding histories into sufficient statistics. For
symmetric information games Markov perfect equilibria [5]
have been introduced, in which the players’ strategies depend
only on payoff-relevant past events and not the whole his-
tory. For asymmetric information games or control problems,
finding the appropriate sufficient statistic is a challenging task
and various information structures and corresponding statistics
have been considered in the literature [6]–[10].
A quantity commonly used as a sufficient statistic, is a belief
over some unknown part of the system. The main challenge in
this context is the emergence of private beliefs in the sufficient
statistics, i.e., the fact that different agents in the system may
have different (private) observations about the same quantity.
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One way to avoid this problem is to consider models in which
private beliefs either do not exist (symmetric information
games, or asymmetric but independent observations [6], [7],
[11]) or, if they exist, they are not taken into account in
agents’ strategies (see for example the concept of “public
perfect equilibrium” [12]). In order to intuitively explain the
conceptual difficulty arising from having private beliefs in the
sufficient statistics, consider the following thought process. If
a player acts according to her private belief ξit of a hidden
variable and she expects other players to behave in the same
way, she needs to form a belief over other players’ beliefs
to interpret and predict their actions and she has to take that
belief into account when acting. In other words, she has to
form a belief over (at least) ξjt for all other users j 6= i. This
is a belief on beliefs which is also a private information of user
i and it has to be taken into account in her strategies. Due to
symmetry of the information structure, all other players should
do the same. But now, it is clear that user i needs to form
beliefs over beliefs over beliefs of other players. This chain
continues as long as this hierarchy of beliefs are private. It
stops whenever the beliefs in one step are public or public
functions of previous step beliefs.
In this paper, we study a dynamic game with asymmetric in-
formation. We consider a model with an unknown state of the
world V , where each player i has a private noisy observation
Xit of it at each time t. The private observations of players
are conditionally independent given V . We then specialize this
setting to the case of a Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) non-
zero-sum game where V is a Gaussian random variable and
players’ observations are generated through a linear Gaussian
model from V . Our LQG model closely follows that of [11]
with one important difference: the private observations of
players in [11] are independent where in our case, they are
dependent through V ; in particular they are conditionally
independent given V . Our model can also be thought of as a
generalization of the one in [13] where V models the value of
a product (or a technology) and agents receive a noisy private
signal about it and decide whether to adopt it or not, with
the important difference that we allow multiple agents to act
simultaneously and, unlike [13], we also allow them to return
to the marketplace at each time instance and receive a new
observation on V .
One of the contributions of this paper is to show that, due to
the conditional independence of the private signals given V ,
the private belief chain stops at the second step and players
beliefs over others’ beliefs are public functions of their own
beliefs (the first step beliefs). In the LQG model, we further
show that the beliefs are Gaussian and hence, are characterized
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by their mean and covariance matrix. Furthermore, the players
estimation over others’ estimations are public linear functions
of their own estimations. We hypothesize (and eventually
prove) structured PBE with strategies for user i being linear
in Vˆ it , the private estimate of V by user i, generated by a
(private) Kalman filter. This is the second contribution of this
work.
We show that the equilibrium strategies can be character-
ized by an appropriate backward sequential decomposition
algorithm akin to dynamic programming. In the LQG model,
the main difference of our work from the standard stochastic
control LQG framework is that the forward recursion that
evaluates covariance matrices cannot be performed separately
as it depends on the equilibrium strategies. This was also
the case in [11]. A unique feature of our development is
the requirement to update in a forward manner additional
quantities that are observation dependent (public actions).
This precludes off-line evaluation of these forward-updated
quantities and necessitates their inclusion as part of the state
of the above mentioned backward sequential decomposition.
This is the third contribution of this work.
A. Literature Review
In this section we give an overview of the related liter-
ature with a focus on the information sructures. In [14],
a framework, called precedence diagram, was introduced to
characterize the information structures in team problems with
asymmetric information. The evolving (dynamic) information
of the decision makers is modeled by a different (new)
controller making a decision at each time with the specific
information corresponding to that time available to her. The
authors have also provided some examples of the dynamic
team problems, one of which is LQG team problem with
nested information structure and have proved optimality of lin-
ear controllers. The specific information structure considered,
nested information, allows the authors to form an equivalent
static team problem for the dynamic model considered and
hence, avoiding furthur challenges of dealing with dynamic
models.
LQG models have been studied extensively for decision
and control problems. In the simplest instance of a single
centralized controller it is well known that there is separation
of estimation and control, posterior beliefs of the state are
Gaussian, a sufficient statistic for control is the state estimate
evaluated by the Kalman filter, the optimal control is linear
in the state estimate, and the required covariance matrices
can be calculated offline [15]. Although it is known that,
in general, linear controllers are not optimal in LQG team
problems [16], as we mentioned, some information structures
have been identified for which linear controllers are shown
to be optimal such as the works with nested information
structure [14], stochastically nested information structure [9]
and partial history sharing information structure [8]. Private
beliefs do not emerge in these models because of the specific
information structure considered. In the nested information
structure, there is no need to form beliefs to interpret the
action of the predecessors because the decision maker already
knows their information. In the model considered in [8], the
decision makers have local memory (not perfect memory) and
the authors have not defined any summaries for the history and
therefore, beliefs and hence, private beliefs are not introduced.
In order to capture the strategic behavior of agents, dynamic
decision problems have also been considered in the context of
dynamic games and there is extensive literature on dynamic
games with asymmetric information. In [17], the author con-
siders a delayed observation sharing model where all of the
previous private observations are shared with all of the players
and the asymmetry of the information is only due to the
private observations at current time. This specific information
structure avoids the private beliefs in the sufficient statistics
because they can be formed by augmenting the public belief by
the current private observation. One-step delayed information
sharing is also used in [18]. Similarly, in [13], [19]–[21], there
is a public belief that can be augmented by the players’ static
private signals, to form the private beliefs.
Authors in [22] have used the common information ap-
proach, which breaks the history into the common and private
parts and similarly, two partial strategies are introduced. One
is applied to the private part of the history and the other
one generates the first one based on the public part of the
history. Finding the strategy that is generated based on the
public part of the history does not have the challenges of
asymmetric games because the public part of the history is
common between all players. The solution concept used is
called common information based Markov perfect equilibria.
Note that in [22], the private part of the history is not
summarized into any other quantity, and therefore, no private
beliefs had to be defined. A similar approach is used in [6].
In [11], authors have considered a multi-stage LQG game
and characterized a signaling equilibrium which is linear in
agents’ private observations. In addition, a backward sequen-
tial decomposition was presented for the construction of the
equilibrium, based on the general development in [7]. In this
work, the private observations are independent across agents
and therefore there are no private beliefs in the game. This is
because a player’s belief over others’ private observations is
independent of her private observation and hence, the belief
is public.
A number of works consider LQG games where information
available to some players is affected by the decision of others.
The works of [23] on strategic information transmission,
and [24] on Gaussian cheap talk consider two-stage games
and focus on Bayesian Nash equilibria. These works, however,
consider games that are not dynamic. This implies that there
is no need to search for the sufficient statistics and no
private belief will be defined. The classic work on Bayesian
persuasion [25], and the related one on strategic deception [26]
consider two-stage and multi-stage games, respectively, and
focus on (sender preferred) subgame perfect equilibria owing
to the fact that strategies (as opposed to only the actions) of
the sender are observed. Although the authors of [26] consider
a dynamic game, they do not summarize the history into time
invariant quantities and they search for the strategies over the
whole time horizon. Therefore, although the problem becomes
intractable for large time horizons, the issue of private beliefs
does not appear.
The unique feature of this work is that we consider de-
pendent private observations (specifically, conditionally inde-
pendent on a hidden state of the world) between agents, in
conjunctions with strategies with time-invariant domains, and
so sufficient statistics (beliefs) are defined. As a result, we
are forced to deal with private beliefs and the aforementioned
issue of the infinite sequence of beliefs on beliefs has to be
resolved. This is what makes the considered model interesting
and more challenging compared to the previous works.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II the general model is described. Section III is a
review of the solution concept that we have considered in this
paper. We develop our main results in Section IV. In section V,
we describe the special case of the model that is an LQG
game, followed by the development of a concrete example in
Section VI together with numerical results. We conclude in
Section VII. Most of the proofs of theorems and lemmas are
relegated to the Appendices at the end of the paper.
B. Notation
We use upper case letters for scalar and vector random
variables and lower case letters for their realizations. We use
the notation P(a|b) to denote the probability P(A = a|B = b)
for discrete random variables and to denote the measure
P(da|B = b) for continuous random variables. Bold upper
case letters are used to denote matrices. Subscripts denote time
indices and superscripts represent player identities. The nota-
tion −i denotes the set of all players except i. All vectors are
column vectors. The transpose of a matrix A (or vector) is de-
noted by A′. We use semicolons “; ” for vertical concatenation
of matrices (or vectors). For any vector (or matrix) with time
and player indices, ait (or A
i
t), a
−i
t denotes the vertical con-
catenation of vectors (or matrices) a1t , a
2
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t , . . ..
Further, ai1:t means (a
i
1, a
i
2, . . . , a
i
t). In general, for any vector
with time and player indices, ait, we remove the superscript
to show the vertical concatenation of the whole vectors and
we remove the subscript to show the set of all vectors for all
times. The matrix of all zeros with appropriate dimensions is
denoted by 0 and the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions
is denoted by I. For two matrices A and B, D(A,B)
represents the block diagonal concatenation of these matrices,
i.e.,
[
A 0
0 B
]
(it applies for any number of matrices).
By D(A−i), we mean the block diagonal concatenation of
matrices Aj for j ∈ −i. Further, qd(A;B) represents B′AB.
For the equation
[
a˜ ; b˜ ; c˜
]
= A
[
a ; b ; c
]
, the
notation (A)a˜,b denotes the submatrix of A corresponding to
rows a˜ and columns b. We use “ : ” for either of the row or
column subscripts to indicate the whole rows or columns, e.g.,
(A):,b denotes the submatrix of A corresponding to columns
b. The trace of matrix A is denoted by tr(A). We use δ(·)
for the Dirac delta function. For any Euclidean set S , ∆(S)
represents the space of all probability measures on S.
II. MODEL
We consider a discrete time dynamic system with N =
{1, 2, ..., N} strategic players over a finite time horizon T =
{1, 2, ..., T}. There is a static unknown state of the world
V ∼ QV (·). Each player has a private noisy observation Xit
of V at every time step t ∈ T . At time t, player i takes
action ait ∈ Ai which is observed publicly by all players.
The private observations are generated according to the kernel
Xit ∼ QiX(·|V,At−1) and they are independent across agents
given V and At−1, i.e.,
P(Xt|V,A1:t−1, X1:t−1) = P(Xt|V,At−1) (1a)
=
∏
i∈N
QiX(X
i
t |V,At−1) (1b)
We assume that players have perfect recall and we can
construct the history of the system at time t as ht =
(v, x1:t, a1:t−1) ∈ Ht and the information set of player i at
time t as hit = (x
i
1:t, a1:t−1) ∈ Hit. At the end of time step
t, each player i receives the reward rit(v, at). We assume that
the rewards are not observed by the players until the end of
the time horizon.
Let gi = (git)t∈T be a probabilistic strategy of player i,
where git : Hit → ∆(Ai), meaning that player i’s action at time
t is generated according to the distribution Ait ∼ git(·|hit). The
strategy profile of all players is denoted by g. For the strategy
profile g, player i’s total expected reward is
J i,g := Eg
{
T∑
t=1
rit(V,At)
}
, (2)
and her objective is to maximize her total expected reward.
III. SOLUTION CONCEPT
We can model this system as a dynamic game with asym-
metric information and an appropriate solution concept for
such games is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE
consists of a pair (β, µ) (an assessment) of strategy profile
β = (βit)t∈T ,i∈N and belief system µ = (µ
i
t)t∈T ,i∈N where
µit : Hit → ∆(Ht) satisfies Bayesian updating and sequential
rationality holds. Bayesian updating includes both on and off
equilibrium histories. This condition requires the beliefs to be
Bayesian updated, if possible, given any history, whether that
history is on equilibrium or off equilibrium [4]. To be more
specific, given history hit, which could be on or off-equlibrium,
and the realizations at time t, i.e., at, xit+1, the beliefs should
be updated according to Bayes rule if Pg(at, xit+1|hit) > 0.
Otherwise, the beliefs could be updated arbitrarily. For any
i ∈ N , t ∈ T , hit ∈ Hit, β˜i, sequential rationality imposes the
following condition for the strategy profile β:
Eβ
iβ−i
µ
{
T∑
n=t
rin(V,An)|hit
}
≥ Eβ˜iβ−iµ
{
T∑
n=t
rin(V,An)|hit
}
(3)
IV. STRUCTURED PBE
The domain of the strategies git(·|hit) is expanding in time.
Finding such strategies is complicated with the complexity
growing exponentially with the time horizon. For this reason,
we consider summaries for hit ∈ Hit, i.e., S(hit), that are time
invariant. We are interested in PBEs with strategies, git(·|hit) =
ψit(·|S(hit)), that are functions of hit only through the sum-
maries S(hit). These PBEs are called structured PBEs [7]. In
contrast to Hit, the set of summaries does not grow in time
and therefore, finding such structured PBEs is less complicated
than a general PBE. According to [7], we can show that
players can guarantee the same rewards by playing structured
strategies compared to the general non-structured ones. In
dynamic games with asymmetric information, summaries are
usually the belief of players over the unknown variables of the
game.
Define the private beliefs over the unknown state of the
world V as
ξit(v) = Pg(v|hit) = Pg(v|xi1:t, a1:t−1) (4)
We further define the conditional public belief over the private
beliefs as follows
pit(ξt|v) = Pg(ξt|v, ht) = Pg(ξt|v, a1:t−1). (5)
Lemma 1 (Conditional Independence of Private Beliefs): We
have the following equation for the conditional public belief
pit(ξt|v) =
∏
i∈N
piit(ξ
i
t|v), (6)
where piit(ξ
i
t|v) = P(ξit|v, a1:t−1). Similarly, we have
Pg(x1:t|v, a1:t−1) =
∏
i∈N
Pg(xi1:t|v, a1:t−1). (7)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that this conditional independence holds regardless of
the strategy profiles g. Using this result, and with a slight
abuse of notation1, we can summarize the conditional public
belief into the vector pit = [pi1t , . . . , pi
N
t ].
We are interested in strategies of the form Ait ∼
ψit(·|ξit, pit) = γit(·|ξit), where γit = θit(pit) and we will prove
that such structured strategies form a PBE of the game. Note
that with the above decomposition of the strategy ψ into
partial strategies γ and the strategy θ, designing strategies ψ
is equivalent to designing θ.
A. Belief Update
In this subsection, we present two lemmas regarding the
beliefs and their update rules.
Lemma 2: The private beliefs can be updated as ξit+1 =
F i(ξit, pi
−i
t , γ
−i
t , at, x
i
t+1), where F
i is defined through
ξit+1(v) =
∫
ξ−it
ξit(v)
∏
j∈−i
pijt (ξ
j
t |v)γjt (ajt |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v, at)∫
ξ−it ,v˜
ξi(v˜)
∏
j∈−i
pijt (ξ
j
t |v˜)γjt (ajt |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v˜, at)
.
(8)
Proof: See Appendix B.
1We will be using pit to denote the joint conditional pit(ξt|v) as well as
the vector of marginal conditionals pit = [pi1t , . . . , pi
N
t ]. The distinction will
be obvious from the context.
Note that this update depends on the strategy profile g
only through the partial function γ−it , i.e., it is independent
of the strategy θ. We will also use the notation ξt+1 =
F (ξt, pit, γt, at, xt+1) for the update function of the vector of
private beliefs.
Lemma 3: The conditional public beliefs can be updated as
piit+1 = F
i
pi(pit, γt, at), where F
i
pi is defined through
piit+1(ξ
i
t+1|v) =
∫
ξit,x
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t|v)γit(ait|ξit)QiX(xit+1|v, at)
1F i(ξit,pi−it ,γ−it ,at,xit+1)(ξ
i
t+1)∫
ξ˜it
piit(ξ˜
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ˜it)
.
(9)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Similar to the previous lemma, this update depends on the
strategy profile g only through the partial function γt, i.e., it
is independent of the strategy θ. We use the notation pit+1 =
Fpi(pit, γt, at) to denote the update function of the vector of
conditional public beliefs.
B. Equilibrium Strategies
In this subsection, we will show that structured strategies of
the form γit(·|ξit), where γit = θit(pit) form sPBE of the game.
The following theorem formalizes this result and presents the
fixed point equation characterizing the equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 1: The strategy profile γ∗t = θt(pit) characterized
by the following fixed point equation, forms a sPBE of the
game. For all i ∈ N ,
γ∗,it (·|ξit) = arg max
γit(·|ξit)
E[rˆit(pit, ξit, Ait)
+ J it+1(Fpi(pit, γ
∗
t , At), F
i(ξit, pit, γ
∗,−i
t , At, X
i
t+1)))|pit, ξit],
(10a)
J it (pit, ξ
i
t) = max
γit(·|ξit)
E[rˆit(pit, ξit, Ait)
+ J it+1(Fpi(pit, γ
∗
t , At), F
i(ξit, pit, γ
∗,−i
t , At, X
i
t+1)))|pit, ξit],
(10b)
where, rˆit(pit, ξ
i
t, a
i
t) = E
[
rit(V,At)|pit, ξit, ait
]
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
We remark here that in equation (10) the update rule of
the public belief pit is using the equilibrium strategies γ∗t
and therefore, for each time instance t, the collection of
equations of the form (10a) for all i ∈ N constitutes a
fixed point equation over the strategy profile γ∗t . The reason
for this is that in characterizing a PBE, one needs to fix
the belief structure and then finds the equilibrium strategies
corresponding to those beliefs. On the other hand, the beliefs
have to be consistent with the equilibrium strategies. This
creates a fixed point equation over γ∗,it . Furthermore, the above
equation has to be solved simultaneously for all i ∈ N , thus
creating the fixed point equation over the strategy γ∗t .
C. Discussion
In this section, we characterized the sufficient statistics
of the histories of the considered dynamic game. As we
mentioned in the Introduction, these summaries include private
beliefs, ξit . One may wonder how we resolved the issue
with the chain of private beliefs that was discussed in the
Introduction. In other words, how did we resolve the issue of
possibly requiring an infinite hierarchy of beliefs on beliefs. In
the previous development, we actually proved that this chain
stops at the second step. To see this, consider the introduction
of private beliefs over others’ private beliefs, i.e., P(ξ−it |hit).
The results of Lemma 1 show that
P(ξ−it |hit)
=
∫
v
P(ξ−it , v|hit) (11a)
=
∫
v
P(ξ−it |v, hit)P(v|hit) (11b)
=
∫
v,x−i1:t
P(ξ−it |v, hit, x−i1:t)P(x−i1:t|v, hit)P(v|hit) (11c)
(a)
=
∫
v,x−i1:t
P(ξ−it |a1:t−1, x−i1:t)P(x−i1:t|v, a1:t−1)P(v|hit)
(11d)
=
∫
v
P(ξ−it |v, a1:t−1)P(v|hit) (11e)
=
∫
v
pit(ξ
−i
t |v)ξit(v), (11f)
where (a) is due to the definition of the private beliefs and (7).
The above implies that these beliefs can be evaluated by the
public information, pit, and the first order private beliefs ξit .
This is the exact reason why pit(ξt|v) was defined.
V. LQG MODEL
In this section, we study a specific instance of the model
discussed so far which is the case where the unknown state
of the world, V , is a Gaussian random variable, the private
observation kernels are linear and Gaussian and the instanta-
neous reward is quadratic. Therefore we have an LQG model.
The motivation for studying this model stems from the general
development in the previous section. In particular we required
that equilibrium strategies are generated based on private
beliefs and public beliefs on beliefs. In the LQG setting these
beliefs can be greatly simplified, thus enabling us to more
succinctly characterize the equilibrium strategies discussed in
the previous section.
In this model, we consider an unknown state of the world
V ∼ N(0,Σ) with size Nv . Each player has a private noisy
observation Xit of V at every time step t ∈ T
xit = v + w
i
t, (12)
where W it ∼ N(0,Qi) and all of the noise random vectors
W it are independent across i and t and also independent of
V . The values of Σ and Qi, ∀i ∈ N are common knowledge
between players. Note that in order to maintain the linearity of
private observations, we have considered uncontrolled private
observations unlike the general model in first part of the paper.
More discussion on this matter can be found in section V-C.
We have ait ∈ Ai = RNa . The instantaneous reward2 is given
by
rit(v, at) =
[
v′ a′t
]
Rit
[
v
at
]
= qd(Rit;
[
v
at
]
), (13)
where Rit is a symmetric matrix of appropriate dimensions.
A. Equilibrium Beliefs
In this setting, we will show that the private beliefs ξit
are Gaussian and since any Gaussian belief can be expressed
in terms of its mean and covariance matrix, we define the
summaries such that they include the mean and covariance
matrices of the beliefs of the players over V . The mean
of each player’s belief, i.e., her estimate of V , will be her
private information. The covariance matrix, however, can be
calculated publicly. We define the private estimate of players
over V as follows. For all i ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
vˆit = E[V |hit] = E[V |xi1:t, a1:t−1], (14)
Since the private beliefs can be expressed in terms of their
means and covariance matrices and since the covariance
matrices are publicly calculated, the conditional public belief
piit(ξ
i
t|v) is equivalent to a belief over the private estimates.
Intuitively, each player, in addition to her own estimate of V ,
needs to interpret actions of others and predict their future
actions. Hence, each player needs to have a belief over the
estimates of other players on V . We will show that this latter
belief is also Gaussian and therefore, one needs to keep track
of only its mean and covariance. We define the following
quantity for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
v˜i,jt = E[Vˆ
j
t |hit] = E[Vˆ jt |xi1:t, a1:t−1]. (15)
The quantity vˆit is player i’s best estimate of V given her
observations up to time t. As mentioned before, this quantity
is a private estimation for player i and is not measurable with
respect to the sigma algebra generated by the observations of
any other player j. Hence, player i should form an estimate
over the private estimates of other players and this is the reason
v˜i,jt is defined. This in turn implies that players’ strategies
should also be a function of their estimates over others’
estimates of V . Hence, the same argument as the one in the
first part of the paper about private beliefs holds and we need
to define an estimate over estimates of players over other
players’ estimates of V . This argument continues as long as
these estimates are private. Therefore, once again, we are faced
with the problem of having to define a chain of private beliefs
which are expressed as private estimates in this model. This
chain stops whenever one of the estimates of players is public
(or a public function of previous-step private estimates) and
therefore, there is no need to form an estimate over it.
Indeed, we will show that v˜i,−it is a public linear function of
vˆit, hence, there is no need to include v˜
i,−i
t in the private part
of the summary S(hit) and therefore, no other player needs
to form an estimate over it. The summary we use for hit is
defined as S(hit) = (vˆ
i
t, P (h
i
t)), where P (h
i
t) is the public
2Unlike more standard LQG setting we consider “rewards” instead of
“costs” to maintain consistency with the general problem discussed earlier.
summary for hit and it includes the covariance matrix of player
i’s belief over V and some other needed quantities that will
be subsequently defined. We are interested in equilibria with
strategies of the form Ait ∼ ψit(·|vˆit, P (hit)) = γit(·|vˆit), where
γit = θ
i
t(P (h
i
t)). In particular, we want to prove that pure
linear strategies of the form γit(a
i
t|vˆit) = δ(ait − Litvˆit −mit),
where Lit and m
i
t are matrices with appropriate dimensions
and are functions of P (hit), form a PBE of the game.
In the next theorem, we show that when linear strategies
are employed, the private beliefs are Gaussian.
Theorem 2: Assuming pure linear strategies of the form
γit(a
i
t|vˆit) = δ(ait−Litvˆit−mit), ∀t ∈ T and ∀i ∈ N , the private
belief ξit on V is Gaussian N(vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t), where vˆ
i
t is the private
estimate of player i of V and Σit is the corresponding covari-
ance matrix, which can be evaluated publicly. Consequently,
the public belief piit(ξ
i
t|v) can be reduced to a belief piit(vˆit|v).
Furthermore, piit(vˆ
i
t|v) is Gaussian with mean Eitv+f it , where
matrices Eit, f
i
t can be evaluated publicly.
Proof: See Appendix E.
In the following we summarize the parameters needed to
update each of the quantities introduced in the proof of
Theorem 2 and we introduce update functions for each one.
vˆit+1 = Fvˆ(vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t+1|t,E
−i
t , f
−i
t ,L
−i
t ,m
−i
t , a
−i
t , x
i
t+1)
(16a)
Σit+1 = FΣi(Σ
i
t+1|t,L
−i
t ) (16b)
Σt+2|t+1 = FΣ(Σt+1|t,Et,Lt) (16c)
Σ˜t+2|t+1 = FΣ˜(Σ˜t+1|t,Σt+1|t,Et,Lt) (16d)
Et+1 = FE(Et,Σt+1|t, Σ˜t+1|t,Lt) (16e)
ft+1 = Ff (ft,Σt+1|t, Σ˜t+1|t,Et,Lt,mt, at) (16f)
Equations (16a) and (16b) correspond to the private belief
update and are similar in structure to the update function F i
of of ξit in Lemma 2 for the general case. The remaining
update functions correspond to the public belief update Fpi in
Lemma 3 for the general case.
Note that according to the above equations, the quantities
Σt+1|t, Σ˜t+1|t, Et are updated recursively using the strategy
matrices Lt. Hence, if one knows the strategies, one can
calculate these quantities offline for the entire time horizon
of the game. However, the quantity fk is updated using the
strategy matrices Lt and vectors mk as well as the realized
actions at and therefore, they cannot be evaluated offline.
We reiterate at this point that Theorem 2 implies that the
estimate of player i over private estimates of players −i, i.e.,
v˜i,−it , is a linear function of vˆ
i
t,
v˜i,−it = E[Vˆ
−i
t |hit] (17a)
= E[E[Vˆ −it |V,A1:t−1]|hit] (17b)
= E[E−it V + f
−i
t |hit] (17c)
= E−it vˆ
i
t + f
−i
t , (17d)
with matrices E−it and f
−i
t being public information. As a
result, assuming linear strategies of the form ait = L
i
tvˆ
i
t+m
i
t at
equilibrium, one can form the summary S(hit) = (vˆ
i
t, P (h
i
t))
and base the selection of the matrices Lit and m
i
t on the public
part of this summary, P (hit). In the next section we show that
indeed linear strategies can form an equilibrium and provide
a methodology to find the quantities Lit and m
i
t.
B. Linear Structured PBE
Theorem 2 implies that Sit =
[
V ; Vˆ −it−1
]
is a jointly
Gaussian random vector conditioned on player i’s observation
till time t, ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T . This implies that the beliefs over
V are jointly Gaussian and so players need only keep track
of their belief’s mean (estimation) and covariance matrices.
Furthermore, this theorem implies that a player’s belief over
other players beliefs is also Gaussian and hence, players need
to keep track of their estimation on other players’ estimations,
i.e., v˜. The important point of Theorem 2 is the statement
that the estimation of players on others’ estimations is a
linear function of their own estimation and hence, in order to
keep track of the estimation over other players’ estimations,
a player only needs to keep track of her own estimation over
V . Therefore, vˆit is a sufficient statistic for player i’s private
observations till time t.
In terms of the public summary, we see four public quan-
tities, Σt+1|t, Σ˜t+1|t, Et and ft in (16). With some abuse
of notation, we define Σt = [Σt+1|t, Σ˜t+1|t]. We will show
that the tupple (Σt,Et, ft) is the public summary of hit, i.e.,
P (hit). Note that Et and ft are involved in the expression for
the mean of the conditional public belief over vˆt, hence, they
correspond to the conditional public belief pit in the first part of
the paper. The convariance matrices Σt+1|t, Σ˜t+1|t represent
the covariance matrices of the private and conditional public
beliefs. This implies that by having the tuple (vˆit,Σt,Et, ft),
we have full characterization of the private and public belief
and therefore, we have the summaries for the LQG game.
Therefore, we consider strategies of the form
ψit(·|vˆit,Σt,Et, ft) = γit(·|vˆit). In particular, we will now show
that linear strategies of the form γit(·|vˆit) = δ(ait−Litvˆit−mit),
where Lt and mt are derived from (Σt,Et, ft), are PBE of
the game.
Theorem 3: The strategy profile ψit(·|vˆit,Σt,Et, ft) =
γit(·|vˆit) ∀i ∈ N where γit(·|vˆit) = δ(ait−Litvˆit−mit), together
with the corresponding Gaussian beliefs derived in Theorem 2,
form a structured PBE of the game.
The strategy matrices Lt and vectors mt are constructed
throughout the proof.
Proof: See Appendix F.
One important result from the proof of Theorem 3 is that
the reward to go, J it (vˆ
i
t,Σt,Et, ft) is quadratic with respect
to vˆit and ft, which are the only quantities in the summary
that can not be evaluated offline, i.e., we have
J it (vˆ
i
t,Σt,Et, ft) = qd(Z
i
t;
[
vˆit
ft
]
) + zi′t
[
vˆit
ft
]
+ oit. (18)
Therefore, if we have the quantities Zit, z
i′
t , and o
i
t we can
evaluate the reward to go for every value of vˆit and ft.
In the following, we propose a backward algorithm that
evaluates the quantities Zit, z
i
t, and o
i
t as well as the strategy
matrices Lt, Mt and vectors m¯t (we have mit = M
i
tft +
m¯it, according to the proof of Theorem 3) as functions of
(Σt,Et). Before stating the algorithm, we define the following
functions.
Lt = gL,t(Σt,Et) (19a)
Mt = gM,t(Σt,Et) (19b)
m¯t = gm¯,t(Σt,Et) (19c)
Zt = ψZ,t(Σt,Et) (19d)
zt = ψz,t(Σt,Et) (19e)
ot = ψo,t(Σt,Et) (19f)
Backward Algorithm (Offline)
1) Set t = T . Set ZT+1 = ψZ,T+1(ΣT+1,ET+1) = 0,
zT+1 = ψz,T+1(ΣT+1,ET+1) = 0 and oT+1 =
ψZ,T+1(ΣT+1,ET+1) = 0 for every ΣT+1,ET+1.
2) Calculate Lt = gL,t(Σt,Et), Mt = gM,t(Σt,Et),
m¯t = gm¯,t(Σt,Et), and Zt = ψZ,t(Σt,Et) for every
Σt,Et and the corresponding ψZ,t+1(·, ·) according to
equation (68) and (70).
3) Set t = t− 1.
4) If t ≥ 1 Go to step 3. Else stop.
Using the functions defined above, one can run the follow-
ing forward algorithm to find the strategy matrices Lt, Mt
and vectors m¯t and the quantities Zit, z
i′
t , and o
i
t.
Forward Algorithm (Offline)
1) Set t = 1.
2) Initialize the value of Σ1 and E1 according to equations
(46) and (54).
3) Using Σt and Et, find Lt, Mt, m¯t and the quantities
Zit, z
i′
t , and o
i
t according to equation (19).
4) Using Σt, Et and Lt, calculate Σt+1 and Et+1 accord-
ing to equations (16).
5) Set t = t+ 1.
6) If t ≤ T , Go to step 3. Else stop.
C. Model Extensions
In this section, we investigate alternative models that can
be studied with the methodology introduced in this paper and
we explain how the results can be extended to such models.
As it is clear in equation (12), in the LQG model considered
in this paper, the private observations are not controlled by
the actions, unlike the general model of the first part of the
paper. If we were to add control actions to equation (12), in
order to maintain linearity, we would have added a term such
as Bitat and therefore, equation (12) would have looked like
xit = v+w
i
t+B
i
tat. Since the actions are publicly observed, the
amount of information that player i extracts from V remains
the same with or without the term Bitat. Hence, because the
private observations serve only as measurements of V , adding
control to equation (12) does not make any difference in the
results.
Controlled private observations could make a difference in
the LQG model if the private observations could affect the in-
stantaneous rewards. That is, if the reward was rit(v, at, x
i
t) =
qd(Rit;
 vat
xit
). Note that the amount of information that xit
conveys about V is still the same as in the uncontrolled case.
We can show that results similar to all of the ones in this paper
will hold for this model with controlled private observations
and this type of instantaneous reward. Note that in this case,
the strategies woud be linear in both the private estimation and
the latest private observation.
We can also extend our results of the first part of the paper
(the general model) to a model with the instantaneous reward
being of the form of rit(v, at, x
i
t). In this case, x
i
t should be
added to the summaries and the results will hold.
VI. EXAMPLE
In this section, we describe some numerical examples to
show the equilibrium strategies discussed in this paper. In
these examples, we derive the equilibrium strategies by solving
a fixed point equation for the entire time horizon using the
following algorithm. Note that the superscript (k) in A(k)
denotes the number of iterations performed. We define the
convergence error as (k) = max(|L(k+1)1:T −L(k)1:T |, |M(k+1)1:T −
M
(k)
1:T |, |m¯(k+1)1:T − m¯(k)1:T |).
Numerical Algorithm (Offline)
1) Set k = 1.
2) Initialize L(1)1:T , M
(1)
1:T , and m¯
(1)
1:T arbitrarily.
3) Using L(k)1:T , evaluate Σ
(k+1)
1:T , E
(k+1)
1:T according to equa-
tions (16) in a forward manner (using initial conditions
Σ1 and E1 according to equations (46) and (54)).
4) Using L(k)1:T , M
(k)
1:T , m¯
(k)
1:T , and Σ
(k+1)
1:T , E
(k+1)
1:T , evaluate
L
(k+1)
1:T , M
(k+1)
1:T , and m¯
(k+1)
1:T according to the backward
algorithm.
5) Evaluate (k). If it is below the desired threshold, stop.
Otherwise, go to step 4.
Note that in each step of the backward algorithm, one needs
to solve a fixed point equation with respect to the strategy
matrices and vectors to derive the functions defined in eq.
(19) (see eq. (68) in Appendix F). However, in the numerical
algorithm described above, we use the last iteration quantities
for the right hand side of the equations and consequently, we
do not need to solve any fixed point equations.
As a concrete example, we consider a setting where there
is a project with an unknown attribute denoted by v. There
are two agents working on this project exerting a costly
effort ait. The agents are rewarded based on the alignment
of their effort with the project attribute, v, as well as based on
their cooperation. At each time slot, the agents have private
observations, xit, of the project attribute. We consider two
instances of the game where v is scalar in one and a two
dimensional vector in the other, while the efforts are scalars
in both.
A. Scalar State and Action
We model the considered scenario for scalar v and scalar
actions ait with the instantaneous rewards being R
1
t (v, at) =
a1t v+
1
2a
1
ta
2
t−(a1t )2 and R2t (v, at) = a2t v+ 12a1ta2t−(a2t )
2. That
is, we set R1t =
 0 12 01
2 −1 14
0 14 0
 and R2t =
 0 0 120 0 14
1
2
1
4 −1
.
Note that the term aitv in the instantaneous rewards accounts
for the alignment of ait with v, and the term a
1
ta
2
t denotes the
cooperation between the agents.
Case 1: If we assume that agents perfectly observe V , i.e., if
we set Q1 = 0 and Q2 = 0, the following linear equilibrium
strategy matrices and vectors are derived from the numerical
analysis of this game for T = 2 and Σ = 1
L11 =
2
3 L
2
1 =
2
3
L12 =
2
3 L
2
2 =
2
3 .
(20a)
Furthermore, we have m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. Note
that since in this case, ft = 0 for t = 1, 2, the strategy matrices
Mit will not play any roles and are not presented here. These
results imply that each agent will exert effort exactly equal to
2
3V . As it turns out, these strategies are myopic, i.e., we also
observe these strategies in the case T = 1. The reason for
having myopic strategies is that the observations are perfect
and hence, the actions have no effect in shaping the future
beliefs.
Case 2: Consider agents with equally imperfect observa-
tions, Q1 = Q2 = 1. The following strategy matrices are
derived
L11 = 0.6722 L
2
1 = 0.6722
L12 = 0.5333 L
2
2 = 0.5333
(21a)
M11 = [0.0561 0.2620] M
2
1 = [0.2620 0.0561]
M12 = [0.0356 0.1422] M
2
2 = [0.1422 0.0356] ,
(21b)
together with m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. Once more,
it is observed that m¯it = 0 and as will be seen, the same
is happening in all of the other cases studied as well. This
could imply that it is sufficient to restrict attention to strategies
with zero m¯it. We also observe that the value of the strategy
matrices decrease with time.
Case 3: If one agent has better observations than the other,
i.e., Q1 = 1, Q2 = 2, the strategy matrices are changed as
follows.
L11 = 0.6700 L
2
1 = 0.6619
L12 = 0.5224 L
2
2 = 0.5373
(22a)
M11 = [0.0520 0.2701] M
2
1 = [0.2738 0.0605]
M12 = [0.0348 0.1433] M
2
2 = [0.1393 0.0358]
(22b)
and m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. One can explain
these results by paying attention to the interactions between
the agents. At t = 1, agent one has a better estimation of
V compared to agent two and therefore, she has higher L11.
At t = 2, agent two has learned the estimation of agent one
through her action at t = 1 and therefore, the two agents
have almost equal estimations. But this time, agent two exerts
slightly higher effort to compensate agent one’s efforts at t =
1.
Case 4: The interaction between agents can also be seen in
a scenario where one agent has perfect observations and the
other one has partial observations, i.e., Q1 = 0, Q2 = 2. The
strategy matrices are given as follows.
L11 = 0.7125 L
2
1 = 0.6781
L12 = 0.5000 L
2
2 = 0.6250
(23a)
M11 = [0.0142 0.1808] M
2
1 = [0.1817 0.0452]
M12 = [0.0333 0.1667] M
2
2 = [0.1333 0.0417] ,
(23b)
and m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2.
Case 5: Finally, consider a case where both agents have
very noisy observations, that is Q1, Q2 are large numbers. In
this case, vˆit = 0 and ft = 0. Therefore, the strategy matrices
Lit and M
i
t do not play any roles and the actions will only
follow m¯it. For this game we obtain m¯
i
t = 0 for t = 1, 2 and
i = 1, 2.
Case 6: We have also derived the strategy matrices of the
game for larger values of T . In Figure 1, we can see the plot of
the strategy matrices Lit with respect to time for the symmetric
case of Q1 = Q2 = 1 and for T = 10. As before, we observe a
trend where as time goes by, the values of the strategy matrices
decrease. The intuition behind why such behavior is observed
is that more public information is observed as time goes by.
Therefore, the players estimation over others’ estimations is
mainly characterized by the public part of the state, ft, rather
than the private estimates. This indicates that the matrix Et
decreases with time and as it is obvserved in our numerical
results in Figure 1, it converges to zero. One can also see that
the strategies decrease as Et decreases. Therefore, the strategy
matrices Lt decrease as time passes and they converge to 0.5,
which is the equilibrium of the game when Et = 0.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
4
8
12
16
t
Lit
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Eit
Eit
Lit
Fig. 1: Strategy matrices Lit and quantities Eit for T = 10.
B. Game vs Centralized LQG
In this subsection, we have compared the total rewards per
time obtained through the game by players for Q1 = Q2 = 1
with a scenario in which both actions are taken by a single
decision maker and the sum of the two rewards are collected by
her. We have done this comparison for different time horizons
T and Figure 2 depicts the plot of the total rewards per time
obtained, JT , in the two considered scenarios. We notice that
players are doing worse compared to the centralized decision
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
T
JT
Game
Centralized LQG
Fig. 2: Total rewards per time obtained in game vs centralized
LQG.
maker, specifically as the time horizon increases. The reason
is that in the game scenario, the uncertainty in predicting
the average reward-to-go increases drastically as time horizon
increases. The centralized decision maker, however, benefits
from time horizon increasing and her total reward per time
converges to one. The reason is that as time goes by, the
estimation over V becomes better and better and the reward
converges to the one in the complete information case.
C. Two Dimensional State and Scalar Action
In this part, we consider a two dimensional attribute vector
for the project, i.e., V is a two dimensional vector. Each
agent tries to be aligned with one element of the attribute
vector while maitaining the cooperation with the other agent.
We can model this alignment and cooperation of agents with
R1t (v, at) = a
1
t v(1) +a
1
ta
2
t − (a1t )2 and R2t (v, at) = a2t v(2) +
a1ta
2
t − (a2t )2. That is, we set R1t =

0 0 12 0
0 0 0 0
1
2 0 −1 12
0 0 12 0
 and
R2t =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 12
0 0 0 12
0 12
1
2 −1
. We also set Σ = [ 1 00 1
]
.
Case 1: The following linear equilibrium strategy matrices
are derived for the full information case.
L11 =
[
2
3
1
3
]
L21 =
[
1
3
2
3
]
L12 =
[
2
3
1
3
]
L22 =
[
1
3
2
3
]
,
(24a)
and m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. Also, similar to the
scalar case, Mit strategy matrices do not play any roles here
since ft = 0. We see that if V is perfectly observed, each agent
will align her effort with a weighted average of V (1) and V (2)
with the element correponding to that agent having twice the
weight. Also, similar to the scalar case, myopic strategies are
played.
Case 2: Consider the partial information scenario with
Q1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and Q2 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. The following linear
equilibrium strategy matrices are derived.
L11 = [0.7224 0.2402] L
2
1 = [0.2402 0.7224]
L12 = [0.4858 0.0842] L
2
2 = [0.0842 0.4858]
(25a)
M11 = [0.2874 0.0780 0.1793 0.6054] (25b)
M21 = [0.6054 0.1793 0.0780 0.2874] (25c)
M12 = [0.1619 0.0281 0.0561 0.3239] (25d)
M22 = [0.3239 0.0561 0.0281 0.1619] , (25e)
and m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. Similar to the scalar
scenario, we observe that the value of the strategy matrices
decrease with time and again, m¯it = 0 for all of the cases.
Case 3: If each agent fully observes her corresponding
element of the state and partially observes the other one, i.e.,
Q1 =
[
0 0
0 1
]
and Q2 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, we have the following
linear equilibrium strategy matrices.
L11 = [0.7198 0.4232] L
2
1 = [0.4232 0.7198]
L12 = [0.5071 0.2055] L
2
2 = [0.2055 0.5071]
(26a)
M11 = [0.3196 0.1506 0.3235 0.6293] (26b)
M21 = [0.6293 0.3235 0.1506 0.3196] (26c)
M12 = [0.1690 0.0685 0.1370 0.3380] (26d)
M22 = [0.3380 0.1370 0.0685 0.1690] (26e)
and m¯it = 0 for t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. An intuitive reason of
why the second element and the first element of the strategy
matrices L1t and L
2
t , respectively, are larger than the previous
case is that the second element and the first element of E1t
and E2t , respectively, have increased.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a dynamic game with asymmetric
information and dependent types and we characterized the
structured perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. We also
studied a special case of our model that was Linear Quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) non-zero-sum game and we characterized
linear structured perfect Bayesian equilibria for the game. One
of the important points that we made in this paper was that
due to the conditional independence of the private signals, the
private belief chain stops at the second step and players beliefs
over others’ beliefs are public functions of their own beliefs.
We further proved that these beliefs are Gaussian in the LQG
case.
A future direction for this research could be investigating
the models for which we have the same interesting features
for the beliefs as we do in this paper. That is, the models for
which the private belief chain stops at two or any other given
number of steps.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
pit(ξt|v) = P(ξt|v, a1:t−1) (27a)
=
∫
x1:t
P(x1:t, ξt, a1:t−1|v)∫
x1:t
P(x1:t, a1:t−1|v) (27b)
=
∫
x1:t
∏
i∈N
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)P(ξit|xi1:t, a1:t−1)∫
x1:t
∏
i∈N
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)
(27c)
=
∏
i∈N
∫
xi1:t
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)P(ξit|xi1:t, a1:t−1)∫
xi1:t
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)
(27d)
=
∏
i∈N
P(ξit, a1:t−1|v)
P(a1:t−1|v) =
∏
i∈N
P(ξit|v, a1:t−1) (27e)
=
∏
i∈N
pit(ξ
i
t|v). (27f)
The second part of the theorem is similarly proved as
follows.
P(x1:t|v, a1:t−1) = P(x1:t, a1:t−1|v)P(a1:t−1|v) (28a)
=
∏
i∈N
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)∫
x1:t
∏
i∈N
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)
(28b)
=
∏
i∈N
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)∏
i∈N
∫
xi1:t
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)
(28c)
=
∏
i∈N
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)∫
xi1:t
t−1∏
s=1
QiX(x
i
s|v, as−1)P(ais|xi1:s, a1:s−1)
QiX(x
i
t|v, at−1)
(28d)
=
∏
i∈N
P(xi1:t, a1:t−1|v)
P(a1:t−1|v) (28e)
=
∏
i∈N
P(xi1:t|a1:t−1, v). (28f)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Using Bayes rule we have
ξit+1(v)
= P(v|xi1:t+1, a1:t) (29a)
=
P(v, xit+1, at|xi1:t, a1:t−1)
P(xit+1, at|xi1:t, a1:t−1)
(29b)
=
∫
ξ−it
P(v, xit+1, at, ξ
−i
t |xi1:t, a1:t−1)∫
ξ−it ,v˜
P(v˜, xit+1, at, ξ
−i
t |xi1:t, a1:t−1)
(29c)
=
∫
ξ−it
P(v|xi1:t, a1:t−1)P(ξ−it |v, a1:t−1)
P(at|ξ−it , v, xi1:t, a1:t−1)QiX(xit+1|v, at)∫
ξ−it ,v˜
P(v˜|xi1:t, a1:t−1)P(ξ−it |v˜, a1:t−1)
P(at|ξ−it , v˜, xi1:t, a1:t−1)QiX(xit+1|v˜, at)
(29d)
=
∫
ξ−it
ξit(v)pi
−i
t (ξ
−i
t |v)
∏
j∈N
γjt (a
j
t |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v, at)∫
ξ−it ,v˜
ξit(v˜)pi
−i
t (ξ
−i
t |v˜)
∏
j∈N
γjt (a
j
t |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v˜, at)
(29e)
=
∫
ξ−it
ξit(v)
∏
j∈−i
pijt (ξ
j
t |v)γjt (ajt |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v, at)∫
ξ−it ,v˜
ξi(v˜)
∏
j∈−i
pijt (ξ
j
t |v˜)γjt (ajt |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v˜, at)
.
(29f)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Using Bayes rule we have
piit+1(ξ
i
t+1|v)
= P(ξit+1|v, a1:t) (30a)
=
∫
ξt,xit+1
P(ξit+1, ξt, xit+1, at|v, a1:t−1)∫
ξt
P(ξt, at|v, a1:t−1) (30b)
=∫
ξt,xit+1
P(ξt|v, a1:t−1)P(at|ξt, a1:t−1)P(xit+1|v, at)
1F i(ξit,pi−it ,γ−it ,at,xit+1)(ξ
i
t+1)∫
ξt
P(ξt|v, a1:t−1)P(at|ξt, a1:t−1)
(30c)
=
∫
ξt,xit+1
∏
j∈N
pijt (ξ
j
t |v)γjt (ajt |ξjt )QiX(xit+1|v, at)
1F i(ξit,pi−it ,γ−it ,at,xit+1)(ξ
i
t+1)∫
ξt
∏
j∈N
pijt (ξ
j
t )γ
j
t (a
j
t |ξjt )
.
(30d)
=
∏
j 6=i
∫
ξjt
pijt (ξ
j
t |v)γjt (ajt |ξjt )∫
ξit,x
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t|v)γit(ait|ξit)QiX(xit+1|v, at)
1F i(ξit,pi−it ,γ−it ,at,xit+1)(ξ
i
t+1)∏
j∈N
∫
ξjt
pijt (ξ
j
t )γ
j
t (a
j
t |ξjt )
(30e)
=
∫
ξit,x
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t|v)γit(ait|ξit)QiX(xit+1|v, at)
1F i(ξit,pi−it ,γ−it ,at,xit+1)(ξ
i
t+1)∫
ξit
piit(ξ
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)
. (30f)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the theorem, we show that if every player −i plays
according to strategy γ∗,−it = θ
−i
t (pit), the best response of
player i is of the form γ∗,it = θ
i
t(pit) and it is derived from the
given fixed point equation. We show that if we fix the update
rule of pit to pit+1 = Fpi(pit, γ∗t , at) = Fpi(pit, θt(pit), at)
and assume that player i is forced to use these beliefs
as her true beliefs, then she faces an MDP with state
(pit, ξ
i
t), action a
i
t and instantaneous reward rˆ
i
t(pit, ξ
i
t, a
i
t) =
E
[
rit(V,At)|pit, ξit, ait
]
.
We first need to prove that the state (pit, ξit) evolves accord-
ing to a controlled Markov process. Indeed,
P(pit+1, ξit+1|pi1:t, ξi1:t, ai1:t) =∫
v,ξ−it ,a
−i
t ,x
i
t+1
pi−it (ξ
−i
t |v)ξit(v)θ−it (pit)(a−it |ξ−it )Q(xit+1|v, at)
1Fpi(pit,θt(pit),at)(pit+1)1F i(ξit,pi−it ,θ−it (pit),at,xit+1)(ξ
i
t+1)
= P(pit+1, ξit+1|pit, ξit, ait). (31)
The average instantaneous reward can now be written as
E[rit(V,At)] = E[E[rit(V,At)|Πt,Ξit, Ait]], where
E[ri(V,At)|pit, ξit, ait]
=
∫
v,a−it
ri(v, at)
∫
ξ−it
P(v, a−it , ξ
−i
t |pit, ξit, ait)
=
∫
v,a−it
ri(v, at)
∫
ξ−it
θ−it (pit)(a
−i
t |ξ−it )pi−it (ξ−it |v)ξit(v)
=
∫
v,a−it
ri(v, at)
∫
ξ−it
θ−it (pit)(a
−i
t |ξ−it )pi−it (ξ−it |v)ξit(v)
=: rˆit(pit, ξ
i
t, a
i
t). (32)
Based on the above, it is now clear that user i faces an MDP
and her best response strategy is the solution of the following
backward dynamic program
J it (pit, ξ
i
t) = max
γit(·|ξit)
E[rˆit(pit, ξit, ait) + J it+1(Πt+1,Ξit+1)|pit, ξit, ait]
(33a)
a∗,it ∼ arg max
γit(·|ξit)
E[rˆit(pit, ξit, ait) + J it+1(Πt+1,Ξit+1)|pit, ξit, ait],
(33b)
where expectation is wrt γit and the conditional distribution
in (31). Consequently the best response of user i is of the
form A∗,it ∼ ψit(·|ξit, pit). Note that in the standard MDP
formulation, it is suficient to only consider the pure strategies.
However, in equation (33), we see randomized strategies.
The reason of this modification is that in a PBE, the beliefs
have to be consistent with the equilibrium strategies and we
need ψit(·|ξit, pit) = γ∗,it (·|ξit) = θit(pit)(·|ξit). Hence, the best
responses satisfy the following fixed point equation at each
time t. For all i and all ξit we have
γ∗,i(·|ξit) = arg max
γi(·|ξit)
E[rˆit(pit, ξit, Ait)
+ J it+1(Fpi(pit, γ
∗
t , At), F
i(ξit, pit, γ
∗,−i
t , At, X
i
t+1)))|pit, ξit],
(34)
where expectation is wrt the distribution
P(at, xit+1|pit, ξit) =∫
ξ−it ,v
γit(a
i
t|ξit)γ∗,−it (a−it |ξ−it )pi−it (ξ−it |v)ξit(v)QiX(xit+1|v, at).
(35a)
The above fixed point might not have a solution in pure strate-
gies and therefore, we had to consider randomized strategies
in equation (33).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Throughout this proof, the submatrices that are not ex-
plicitely specified are all zero matrices with appropriate di-
mensions.
In order to prove the theorem we will define a dynamical
system from the viewpoint of a specific user i and show
inductively that it is a Gauss Markov model. Gaussianity of
both private and conditional public beliefs follows from KF-
type arguments.
For each player i ∈ N , we define an unobserved state vector
as
sit =
[
v ; vˆ−it−1
]
. (36a)
and an observation vector
yit =
[
a−it−1 −m−it−1 ; xit
]
. (36b)
We will show that the random vector sit evolves according
to a linear Gaussian process,
sit+1 = A
i
ts
i
t +
[
0
Dit
]
ait−1 +
[
0
Hit
]
w−it +
[
0
dit
]
(37a)
yit = C
i
ts
i
t +
[
0
I
]
wit, (37b)
where
Ait =
[
I 0
G−it
]
, (37c)
Cit =
[
0 D(L−it−1)
I 0
]
. (37d)
Note that (yi1:t, a
i
1:t−1) is a shifted version of h
i
t. We prove the
validity of (37) and the claim of the theorem using induction.
In particular, Lemma 4 below is the induction basis and the
subsequent Lemma 5 is the induction step. This concludes the
proof of the theorem.
Lemma 4: The following are true.
(a) ξi1 is Gaussian N(vˆ
i
1,Σ
i
1), with vˆ
i
1 = Σ(Σ + Q
i)
−1
xi1 and
Σi1 = Σ − Σ(Σ + Qi)−1Σ. Consequently the public belief
pii1(ξ
i
1|v) reduces to pii1(vˆi1|v).
(b) (37) holds for t = 1.
(c) The public belief pii1(vˆ
i
1|v) is Gaussian with mean
E[Vˆ i1 |v] = Ei1v + f i1, with Ei1 = Σ(Σ + Qi)−1, f i1 = 0,
and covariance matrix Σ(Σ + Qi)−1Qi(Σ + Qi)−1Σ.
Proof:
(a) We have xi1 = v + w
i
1 and ξ
i
1(v) = P(v|xi1), so due to
joint Gaussianity of V and Xi1 we have that ξ
i
1 is N(vˆ
i
1,Σ
i
1),
with mean
vˆi1 = E[V |xi1] (38a)
= E[V ] + E[V Xi′1 ]E[Xi1Xi′1 ]
−1
(xi1 − E[Xi1]) (38b)
= Σ(Σ + Qi)
−1
xi1, (38c)
and covariance matrix
Σi1 = Σ−Σ(Σ + Qi)−1Σ. (39)
As a result the only private information of user i relevant to
other users is vˆi1 and the public belief pi
i
1(ξ
i
1|v) can be reduced
to pii1(vˆ
i
1|v).
(b) We have si1 =
[
v ; 0
]
and si2 =
[
v ; vˆ−i1
]
. The
first row of (37a) is evidently true. For the second row, using
the result (from part (a)) vˆj1 = Σ(Σ + Q
j)
−1
(v+wj1), we can
derive G−i1 , H
i
1, D
i
1 and d
i
1 as
G−i1 =
[
Σ(Σ + Q−i)−1 0
]
(40a)
Hi1 = D(Σ(Σ + Q
−i)
−1
) (40b)
Di1 = 0 (40c)
di1 = 0, (40d)
where Σ(Σ + Q−i)−1 is the vertical concatenation of the
matrices Σ(Σ + Qj)−1 for j ∈ −i.
(c) Since vˆi1 = Σ(Σ + Q
i)
−1
(v + wi1) we deduce that
pii1(vˆ
i
1|v) is Gaussian with mean E[Vˆ i1 |v] = Σ(Σ + Qi)−1v
and covariance matrix Σ˜i1 = Σ(Σ + Q
i)−1Qi(Σ + Qi)−1Σ.
Lemma 5: Assuming pure linear strategies of the form
γjt (a
j
t |vˆjt ) = δ(ajt −Ljt vˆjt −mjt ) for all j ∈ N , and assuming
that (37) holds for t ≤ k and E[Vˆ jk |v, a1:k−1] = Ejkv + f jk ,
the following are true.
(a) ξik+1 is N(vˆ
i
k+1,Σ
i
k+1) with
vˆik+1 = G
i,i
k+1
[
vˆik
xik+1
]
+ di,ik+1, (41)
where Gi,ik+1, d
i,i
k+1 and Σ
i
k+1 can be publicly evaluated.
Consequently, the public belief piik+1(ξ
i
k+1|v) can be reduced
to a belief piik+1(vˆ
i
k+1|v).
(b) (37) holds for t = k + 1.
(c) The conditional public belief, piik+1(vˆ
i
k+1|v), are Gaussian
with mean E[Vˆ ik+1|V, a1:k] = Eik+1V + f ik+1 and covariance
matrix Σ˜ik+1, where matrices E
i
k+1 and Σ˜
i
k+1 and vector f
i
k+1
can be publicly evaluated.
Proof: (a) We first show one important result from the
lemma assumptions. Notice that due to conditional indepen-
dence of xjk’s given v across time and players, and since vˆ
j
k
is a function of xj1:k and a1:k−1, we have
v˜i,jk = E[Vˆ
j
k |xi1:k, a1:k−1] (42a)
= EV [E[Vˆ jk |V, xi1:k, a1:k−1]|xi1:k, a1:k−1] (42b)
= EV [E[Vˆ jk |V, a1:k−1]|xi1:k, a1:k−1] (42c)
= EV [EjkV + f
j
k |xi1:k, a1:k−1] (42d)
= EjkE[V |xi1:k, a1:k−1] + f jk (42e)
= Ejkvˆ
i
k + f
j
k . (42f)
By using the assumption that (37) holds for t = k, we form
a linear Gaussian model with partial observations and use
Kalman filter results [15, Ch.7]. Consider equation (37) for t =
k. By using standard Kalman filter results [15, Ch.7], we know
that the belief over the system states given the observations
is Gaussian and therefore, the private belief ξik is N(vˆ
i
k,Σ
i
k).
We denote E[Sik+1|yi1:k+1, ai1:k] and E[Sik+1|yi1:k, ai1:k−1] by
sik+1|k+1 and s
i
k+1|k, respectively. We have
sik+1|k+1 = E[S
i
k+1|xi1:k+1, a1:k] (43a)
=
[
vˆik+1
E[Vˆ −ik |xi1:k+1, a1:k]
]
(43b)
= Aiks
i
k|k +
[
0
Dik
]
aik−1
+ Jik+1(y
i
k+1 −Cik+1sik+1|k) +
[
0
dik
]
. (43c)
Therefore,
vˆik+1 = vˆ
i
k + (J
i
k+1)vˆi,:(y
i
k+1 −Cik+1sik+1|k) (44a)
= vˆik + (J
i
k+1)vˆi,:
[
a−ik −m−ik −D(L−ik )v˜i,−ik
xik+1 − vˆik
]
(44b)
= vˆik + (J
i
k+1)vˆi,:
[ −D(L−ik )E−ik vˆik
xik+1 − vˆik
]
+ (Jik+1)vˆi,a−i(a
−i
k −m−ik −D(L−ik )f−ik ) (44c)
= Gi,ik+1
[
vˆik
xik+1
]
+ di,ik+1, (44d)
where
(Gi,ik+1):,xi = (J
i
k+1)vˆi,xi (45a)
(Gi,ik+1):,vˆi = I−(Jik+1)vˆi,a−iD(L−ik )E−ik − (Jik+1)vˆi,xi
(45b)
di,ik+1 = (J
i
k+1)vˆi,a−i(a
−i
k −m−ik −D(L−ik )f−ik ).
(45c)
The matrix Jik+1 and the covariance matrix of S
i
k+1 condi-
tioned on yi1:k+1 and y
i
1:k, denoted by Σ
i
k+1|k+1 and Σ
i
k+1|k,
respectively, can be derived from the standard Kalman filter
equations as follows
Σik+1|k = A
i
kΣ
i
k|kA
i′
k +
[
0
Hik
]
D(Q−i)
[
0
Hik
]′
(46a)
Jik+1 = Σ
i
k+1|kC
i′
k+1(C
i
k+1Σ
i
k+1|kC
i′
k+1
+
[
0
I
]
Qi
[
0
I
]′
)−1 (46b)
Σik+1|k+1 = (I− Jik+1Cik+1)Σik+1|k (46c)
Σi1|1 = E[S
i
1S
i′
1 ]− E[Si1Xi′1 ](E[Xi1Xi′1 ])−1E[Si1Xi′1 ]′
(46d)
=
[
Σ 0
0 0
]
−
[
Σ
0
]
(Σ + Qi)−1
[
Σ 0
]
(46e)
=
[
Σ−Σ(Σ + Qi)−1Σ 0
0 0
]
. (46f)
Note that, for notational simplicity, we remove the time sub-
scripts from submatrix notation, so that (Jik+1)vˆi,xi denotes
(Jik+1)vˆik+1,xik .
Finally, we have Σit = (Σ
i
t+1|t)v,v . Unlike vˆ
i
t, which is
part of the private information of player i, the matrix Σit is a
public quantity due to the independence of equation (46c) to
the private observations of player i.
(b) Equation (37a) is obvious for the first part of the state, v. In
order to prove the other parts of equation (37a) for t = k+ 1,
we consider the dynamic system (37) for each of the players
−i for t = k and we write (44) for players −i. Since x−ik+1 is
not part of yik+1, we can substitute it by v+w
−i
k+1 and derive
Gjk+1, D
i
k+1, H
i
k+1, and d
i
k+1 for all j ∈ −i as
(Gjk+1):,v = (J
j
k+1)vˆj ,xj (47a)
(Gjk+1):,vˆj = I− (Jjk+1)vˆj ,a−jD(L−jk )E−jk − (Jjk+1)vˆj ,xj
(47b)
(Dik+1)vˆj ,: = (J
j
k+1)vˆj ,ai (47c)
(dik+1)vˆj = (J
j
k+1)vˆj ,a−ij (a
−ij
k −m−ijk −D(L−ijk )f−ijk )
+ (Jjk+1)vˆj ,ai(−mik − Likf ik) (47d)
Hik+1 = D((J
−i
k+1)vˆ−i,x−i). (47e)
The notation −ij means all of the players exept i and j. We
have derived the matrices Aik+1, D
i
k+1, H
i
k+1, and vector
dik+1 and so (37) holds for t = k + 1.
(c) In order to show that the conditional public belief
piik+1(vˆ
i
k+1|v) is Gaussian, we consider a conditional Gauss
Markov model. Note that the conditional public belief is
publicly measurable conditioned on V . We use this fact to
form a conditional model, where the observations are the
conditions in the conditional public belief and we derive
conditional Kalman filters. Using (37) for t ≤ k + 1, we can
construct the following linear Gaussian model for t ≤ k+ 1,
State:
s˜t =
[
v
vˆt−1
]
, (48a)
State Evolution:
s˜t+1 = A˜ts˜t + H˜twt + d˜t, (48b)
Observation:
y˜t =
[
v
at−1 −mt−1
]
= C˜tst, (48c)
where
A˜t =
[
I 0
G˜t
]
(49a)
(G˜t)vˆi,vvˆi = (G
i
t):,vvˆi , ∀i ∈ N (49b)
(H˜t)vˆi,wi = (J
i
t)vˆi,xi , ∀i ∈ N (49c)
(d˜t)vˆi = d
i,i
t , ∀i ∈ N (49d)
C˜t =
[
I 0
0 D(Lt−1)
]
. (49e)
Using this conditional Gauss Markov model, we can conclude
that the conditional public beliefs pijk+1(vˆ
j
k+1|v) are Gaussian
and by using Kalman filter results for t = k+ 1, we can write
s˜k+2|k+1
= E[S˜k+2|y˜1:k+1] (50a)
= E[S˜k+2|v, a1:k] (50b)
= A˜k+1s˜k+1|k + A˜k+1J˜k+1(y˜k+1 − C˜k+1s˜k+1|k) + d˜k+1.
(50c)
Therefore,
E[Vˆk+1|v, a1:k]
= (G˜k+1):,vv + (G˜k+1):,vˆE[Vˆk|v, a1:k−1]
− (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,aD(Lk)E[Vˆk|v, a1:k−1]
+ (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,a(ak −mk) + (d˜k+1)vˆ. (51a)
Using the assumption of E[Vˆk|v, a1:k−1] = Ekv+fk, we have
the following
E[Vˆk+1|v, a1:k]
= (G˜k+1):,vv + (G˜k+1):,vˆ(Ekv + fk)
− (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,aD(Lk)(Ekv + fk)
+ (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,a(ak −mk) + (d˜k+1)vˆ (52a)
= Ek+1v + fk+1, (52b)
where
Ek+1 = (G˜k+1):,v + ((G˜k+1):,vˆ
− (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,aD(Lk))Ek (53a)
fk+1 = ((G˜k+1):,vˆ − (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,aD(Lk))fk
+ (A˜k+1J˜k+1)vˆ,a(ak −mk) + (d˜k+1)vˆ, (53b)
and similar to part (a) of the proof, the covariance matrix of
S˜k+1 conditioned on y˜1:k+1 and y˜1:k, denoted by Σ˜k+1|k+1
and Σ˜k+1|k, respectively, and the matrix J˜k+1 are derived
from the following Kalman filter equations.
Σ˜k+1|k = A˜kΣ˜k|kA˜
′
k + H˜kD(Q)H˜
′
k (54a)
J˜k+1 = Σ˜k+1|kC˜
′
k+1(C˜k+1Σ˜k+1|kC˜
′
k+1)
−1 (54b)
Σ˜k+1|k+1 = (I− J˜k+1C˜k+1)Σ˜k+1|k (54c)
Σ˜1|1 = E[S˜1S˜
′
1]− E[S˜1V ′](E[V V ′])−1E[S˜1V ′]′ (54d)
= 0. (54e)
Note that if we know Σk+1|k, Σ˜k+1|k, Ek and fk, we can
publicly evaluate all of the other quantities defined in this proof
for k+1 for a given strategy matrices Lk and vectors mk and
therefore, we can find Σk+2|k+1, Σ˜k+2|k+1, Ek+1 and fk+1.
We can also find Gi,ik+1 and d
i,i
k+1, which are used to update
vˆik to vˆ
i
k+1.
APPENDIX F
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We show that for any t ∈ T , if all players −i play according
to the strategy γ−it (a
−i
t |vˆ−it ) = δ(a−it −D(L−it )vˆ−it −m−it ),
where m−it = M
−i
t ft + m¯
−i
t , and the strategies of players
are linear in vˆk for k < t, player i faces an MDP with
state (vˆit,Σt,Et, ft) and her best response is of the form
γit(a
i
t|vˆit) = δ(ait −D(Lit)vˆit −mit), where mit = Mitft + m¯it.
By using the results from Theorem 2, given the strategy
profile γt, (vˆit,Σt,Et, ft) forms a Markov chain. Notice that
Vˆ it+1,Σt+1,Et+1, ft+1 are updated by γt which is linear and
therefore, all results from Theorem 2 hold.
Lemma 6: One can write the expected value of the instan-
taneous reward R¯it = E[rit(V,At)|ait, vˆit,Σit,Et, ft] as
R¯it = qd(R¯
i
t;
 vˆitait
ft
) + b¯i′t
 vˆitait
ft
+ c¯it, (55)
where R¯it, b¯
i
t and c¯
i
t are constructed in the proof.
Proof: Since we assume all players −i play according to
γ−it , we have a
−i
t = D(L
−i
t )vˆ
−i
t + M
−i
t ft + m¯
−i
t and so the
instantaneous reward can be rewritten as follows.
rit(v, at) = qd(R
i
t;
[
v
at
]
) (56a)
= qd(R˜it;

v
ait
vˆ−it
ft
) + b˜i′t

v
ait
vˆ−it
ft
+ c˜it, (56b)
where
R˜it =
[
INv+Na 0 0
0 D(L−it ) M
−i
t
]′
I˜′2,i+1R
i
tI˜2,i+1 (57a)[
INv+Na 0 0
0 D(L−it ) M
−i
t
]
(57b)
I˜2,i+1 =

INv 0 0 0
0 0 I(i−1)Na 0
0 INa 0 0
0 0 0 I(N−i)Na
 , (57c)
where Ik is the identity matrix with size k × k.
b˜i′t = 2
[
0
m¯−it
]′
I˜′2,i+1R
i
tI˜2,i+1[
INv+Na 0 0
0 D(L−it ) M
−i
t
]
(57d)
c˜it =
[
0
m¯−it
]′
I˜′2,i+1R
i
tI˜2,i+1
[
0
m¯−it
]
. (57e)
We can now calculate the expected value of Ri as follows.
R¯it = qd(R˜
i
t;

vˆit
ait
v˜i,−it
ft
) + tr(R˜itΣ¯it) + b˜i′t

vˆit
ait
v˜i,−it
ft
+ c˜it,
(58)
where
Σ¯it =

Σit 0 Σ
i
tE
−i′
t 0
0 0 0 0
E−it Σ
i
t 0 (Σ
i
t+1|t)vˆ−i,vˆ−i 0
0 0 0 0
 . (59)
By using v˜i,−it = E
−i
t vˆ
i
t + f
−i
t , we can derive the equations
for R¯it, b¯
i
t and c¯
i
t.
R¯it =

INv 0 0
0 INa 0
E−it 0 Iˆ−i
0 0 INvN

′
R˜it

INv 0 0
0 INa 0
E−it 0 Iˆ−i
0 0 INvN

(60a)
b¯i′t = b˜
i′
t

INv 0 0
0 INa 0
E−it 0 Iˆ−i
0 0 INvN
 (60b)
(Iˆ−i):,f−i = I(N−1)Nv (60c)
c¯it = tr(R˜
i
tΣ¯
i
t) + c˜
i
t, (60d)
In the next lemma, we show that the reward-to-go at time t
is a quadratic functions of
[
vˆit
ft
]
and we will construct the
strategy matrix and vector Lit and m
i
t.
Lemma 7: We have the following equation for the
reward-to-go function, J it (vˆ
i
t,Σt,Et, ft) = qd(Z
i
t;
[
vˆit
ft
]
) +
zi′t
[
vˆit
ft
]
+ oit.
Note that the above equation only highlights the functionality
of the reward-to-go with respect to vˆit and ft. We do not care
about its functionality with respect to Σt and Et due to two
reasons. First, they are part of the public part of the history
and are not parameters of the partial strategies γ. Second, they
are not controlled by the actions. As we will see in the proof
of this lemma, Zit, z
i
t and o
i
t are functions of Σt and Et.
Proof: We prove the lemma by backward induction. For
T + 1, we have J iT+1(vˆ
i
T+1,ΣT+1,ET+1, fT+1) = 0 and by
setting ZiT+1 = 0, z
i
T+1 = 0, o
i
T+1 = 0, the equation holds.
Assume that the lemma holds for t+ 1. We will show that
it will also hold for t.
J it (vˆ
i
t,Σt,Et, ft) = max
ait
Eγ
−i
t [rit(V,At)
+ J it+1(Vˆ
i
t+1,Σt+1,Et+1, ft+1)|ait, vˆit,Σt,Et, ft]
(61a)
= max
ait
{qd(R¯it;
 vˆitait
ft
) + b¯i′t
 vˆitait
ft
+ c¯it
+ Eγ
−i
t [qd(Zit+1;
[
Vˆ it+1
ft+1
]
) + zi′t+1
[
Vˆ it+1
ft+1
]
+ oit+1|ait, vˆit,Σt,Et, ft]}. (61b)
First consider the J it+1 part.
Eγ
−i
t [qd(Zit+1;
[
Vˆ it+1
ft+1
]
) + zi′t+1
[
Vˆ it+1
ft+1
]
+ oit+1|ait, vˆit,Σt,Et, ft]
= Eγ
−i
t [qd(Zit+1; Gˆ
i
t+1

vˆit
ait
Vˆ −it
Xit+1
ft
+ gˆit+1)
+ zi′t+1(Gˆ
i
t+1

vˆit
ait
Vˆ −it
Xit+1
ft
+ gˆit+1)
+ oit+1|ait, vˆit,Σt,Et, ft] (62)
= qd(Z¯it+1;
 vˆitait
ft
) + z¯i′t+1
 vˆitait
ft
+ o¯it+1, (63)
where
(Gˆit+1)vˆi,vˆi = (G
i,i
t+1):,vˆi (64a)
(Gˆit+1)vˆi,vˆ−i = (J
i
t+1)vˆi,a−iD(L
−i
t ) (64b)
(Gˆit+1)vˆi,xi = (G
i,i
t+1):,xi (64c)
(Gˆit+1)vˆi,f−i = (J
i
t+1)vˆi,a−iD(L
−i
t ) (64d)
(Gˆit+1)fj ,f−j = ((G˜t+1):,vˆ − (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆ,aD(Lt))fj ,f−j
− (Jjt+1)vˆj ,a−jD(L−jt )− (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆj ,ai(Mit):,f−j
− (Jjt+1)vˆj ,ai(Mit):,f−j , ∀j 6= i (64e)
(Gˆit+1)fj ,fj = ((G˜t+1):,vˆ − (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆ,aD(Lt))fj ,fj
− (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆj ,ai(Mit):,fj − (Jjt+1)vˆj ,ai(Mit):,fj ,
∀j 6= i (64f)
(Gˆit+1)fi,f−i = ((G˜t+1):,vˆ − (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆ,aD(Lt))fi,f−i
− (Jit+1)vˆi,a−iD(L−it )− (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆi,ai(Mit):,f−i ,
(64g)
(Gˆit+1)fi,fi = ((G˜t+1):,vˆ − (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆ,aD(Lt))fi,fi
− (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆi,ai(Mit):,fi , ∀j 6= i (64h)
(Gˆit+1)fj ,ai = (J
j
t+1)vˆj ,ai + (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆj ,ai ,∀j 6= i (64i)
(Gˆit+1)fi,ai = (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆi,ai (64j)
(Gˆit+1)fk,vˆj = (J
k
t+1)vˆk,ajL
j
t + (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆk,ajL
j
t ,
∀j 6= i,∀k 6= j (64k)
(Gˆit+1)fj ,vˆj = (A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆj ,ajL
j
t , ∀j 6= i (64l)
(gˆit+1)fi = −(A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆi,aim¯it (64m)
(gˆit+1)fj = −(A˜t+1J˜t+1)vˆj ,aim¯it − (Jjt+1)vˆj ,aim¯it, ∀j 6= i,
(64n)
and we have
Z¯it+1 = T
i′
t+1Gˆ
i′
t+1Z
i
t+1Gˆ
i
t+1T
i
t+1 (65a)
Tit+1 =

INv 0 0
0 INa 0
E−it 0 Iˆ−i
INv 0 0
0 0 INvN
 (65b)
z¯i′t+1 = (2gˆ
i′
t+1Z
i
t+1Gˆ
i
t+1 + z
i′
t+1Gˆ
i
t+1)T
i
t+1 (65c)
o¯it+1 = gˆ
i′
t+1Z
i
t+1gˆ
i
t+1 + tr(Gˆ
i′
t+1Z
i
t+1Gˆ
i
t+1Σˆ
i
t+1)
+ zi′t+1gˆ
i
t+1 + o
i
t+1 (65d)
Σˆit+1 = Cov(

vˆit
ait
Vˆ −it
Xit+1
ft
 |ait, vˆit,Σt,Et, ft) (65e)
(Σˆit+1)vˆ−ixi,vˆ−ixi =
[
(Σit+1|t)vˆ−i,vˆ−i E
−i
t Σ
i
t
ΣitE
−i′
t Σ
i
t + Q
i
]
. (65f)
Therefore, one can write the expected reward-to-go as
follows.
J it (vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,Et, ft) = max
ait
{qd(R¯it;
 vˆitait
ft
) + b¯i′t
 vˆitait
ft

+ c¯it + qd(Z¯
i
t+1;
 vˆitait
ft
) + z¯i′t+1
 vˆitait
ft
+ o¯it+1}
= max
ait
{qd(R¯it + Z¯it+1;
 vˆitait
ft
) + (b¯i′t + z¯i′t+1)
 vˆitait
ft

+ c¯it + o¯
i
t+1}. (66)
The above equation is quadratic with respect to ait and
therefore, if (R¯it + Z¯
i
t+1)ai,ai is negative semi definite, the
maximum value is achieved when the gradient of the above
equation with respect to ait is zero.
2(R¯it + Z¯
i
t+1)ai,aia
i
t + 2(R¯
i
t + Z¯
i
t+1)ai,vˆif
[
vˆit
ft
]
+ (b¯it + z¯
i
t+1)ai = 0 (67a)
⇒ ait = −(R¯it + Z¯it+1)−1ai,ai((R¯it + Z¯it+1)ai,vˆif
[
vˆit
ft
]
+
1
2
(b¯it + z¯
i
t+1)ai).
(67b)
Finally, we can derive the best response strategy of player
i to be γit(·|vˆit) = δ(ait − Litvˆit −mit) where
Lit = −(R¯it + Z¯it+1)−1ai,ai(R¯it + Z¯it+1)ai,vˆi (68a)
mit = −(R¯it + Z¯it+1)−1ai,ai((R¯it + Z¯it+1)ai,fft
+
1
2
(b¯it + z¯
i
t+1)ai). (68b)
Note that we have mit = M
i
tft + m¯
i
t, where
Mit = −(R¯it + Z¯it+1)−1ai,ai(R¯it + Z¯it+1)ai,f (68c)
m¯it = −
1
2
(R¯it + Z¯
i
t+1)
−1
ai,ai(b¯
i
t + z¯
i
t+1)ai . (68d)
By substituting the best response action in the reward-to-go
equation (66), we have the following final step of the proof.
J it (vˆ
i
t,Σt,Et, ft) = qd(Z
i
t;
[
vˆit
ft
]
) + zi′t
[
vˆit
ft
]
+ oit, (69)
where
Zit = Tˆ
i′
t (R¯
i
t + Z¯
i
t+1)Tˆ
i
t (70a)
Tˆit =
 INv 0Lit Mit
0 INvN
 (70b)
zi′t = 2mˆ
i′
t (R¯
i
t + Z¯
i
t+1)Tˆ
i
t + (b¯
i′
t + z¯
i′
t+1)Tˆ
i
t (70c)
mˆit =
 0m¯it
0
 (70d)
oit = mˆ
i′
t (R¯
i
t + Z¯
i
t+1)mˆ
i
t + (b¯
i′
t + z¯
i′
t+1)mˆ
i
t + c¯
i
t + o¯
i
t+1.
(70e)
Note that in order to derive the γit strategy matrix and vector,
Lit and m
i
t, we need to know L
−i
t and m
−i
t . Clearly, the same
is true for calculating L−it and m
−i
t . On the other hand, some
of the quantitites used in the proof, like Gˆit+1, require L
i
t and
mit to be evaluated. Therefore, we have a fixed point equation
over Lt and mt.
Note that we have such linear solution only if the matrix
(R¯it+ Z¯
i
t+1)ai,ai is invertible and negative semidefinite for all
i ∈ N .
We conclude the proof of the theorem by noting that in
Lemma 7, we proved that the reward to go is a quadratic
function of
[
vˆit
ft
]
and as a result and throughout the proof,
we derived equation (68) for the best response strategy of
player i. Equation (68) indicates that the linear strategies in
terms of
[
vˆit
ft
]
form equilibria of the game and the theorem
is proved.
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